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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

24 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : Limited Forces and Their Combat Employment

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article explains the concept of establishment of limited forces generated after a nuclear strike and their formation into temporary composite groups. The author includes revised tasks and unit-by-unit destruction of the enemy among the special features of limited forces combat actions, and stresses the importance of restoring combat effectiveness and control. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967. 50X1-HUM

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the Codeword 50X1-HUM

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB – 312/02552-74

DATE OF INFO. Late 1967

DATE 24 July 1974

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Nature of Limited Forces and Special Features of Their Combat Actions

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought". The author of this article, Colonel L. Semeyko, defines limited forces as troops remaining after a nuclear strike and formed into temporary composite groups of remnants of previous combat elements or composite units having an organic T/O base. The article theorizes that the combat actions of these limited forces will be similar to those of standard composition units, with allowances for the relationships of forces and other situation factors. Revised combat tasks in a narrowed offensive zone, and multistage rather than simultaneous destruction of the enemy are among the special features discussed. The author emphasizes the effect of reduced nuclear capability and the problems and importance of restoring troop combat effectiveness and control.

End of Summary

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Comment:

Lt. Col. L. Semeyko is probably identical with Dr. Lev Semenovich Semeyko (Lt. Col. Ret.), who since February 1971 has been a member of the Military and Arms Control Staff at the USA Institute. Dr. Semeyko published frequently while he was still on active duty and has continued to do so while at the Institute. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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The Essence of Limited Forces and Special Features of Their Combat Actions

by

Colonel L. Semeyko

Losses of troops are an inevitable phenomenon of any war. The infliction of huge losses on troops and the spasmodic increase of these losses in an extremely limited time period, however, will be characteristic only of nuclear war, as will the fundamental disruption of the organizational structure of the troops and the control and support systems at both the tactical and operational levels. This calls into being a new concept--limited forces, and the questions of using these forces in combat are turning into a most important problem requiring its own solution.

The essence of limited forces. First, we have to concede that this concept should not be identified with the outwardly comparable terms "limited composition of forces" or "limited combat strength". Such identification can introduce contradictions in the understanding of the problem as a whole, since these terms have a different content peculiar only to them.

We know that the theory of military art allows border military district troops which are neither brought up to full strength nor completely mobilized to go over to the offensive immediately at the beginning of a war. Their composition is defined accurately enough by the concept of "limited combat strength". However, it has nothing in common with limited forces in the sense which must be given to them.

In the past war, for example, many armies and fronts conducted operations, particularly defensive ones, essentially with limited combat strength (in comparision to organic strength), with units and large units not at full strength; this was explained by many reasons including the difficulties of bringing them up to full enough strength in time during combat actions. Not only the strength levels of our large units but also the strength levels of armies and fronts were most varied; however, in all cases, these forces were given appropriate combat tasks which they persistently fulfilled.*

* In 1942-1944, when rifle division authorized strength averaged 10,000 men, the actual staffing was: 3.3 percent of the divisions had 1,000 to 3,000 men; 34.1 percent had 3,000 to 5,000 men; 36.9 percent, 5,000 to 7,000; and 25.7 percent, 7,000 to 8,000 or more.

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Defining limited forces, of course, requires a sufficiently clear criterion. We believe that this criterion can be a certain degree of change in the original combat strength and organizational structure of the troops, by which the formation, large unit and unit already operate not in standard (authorized) form but primarily in the form of temporary composite groups of troops. With certain scales and nature of losses of troops their former strength may be changed radically, and the remaining troops will really not be able to be considered as, for example, a regiment, division or army. With this, troops lose their ability to operate in their former organizational forms; however, they may possess a certain amount of combat effectiveness, operating mainly in the form of composite detachments, battalions, regiments or even divisions. Radical changes in the combat strength and table of organization strength of troop organizations cannot help but entail significant changes in the methods of the combat operations of the troops, which is highly important to consider. A qualitatively new phenomenon appears: so-called limited forces are formed.

Based on the foregoing, it appears that the following definition may be given: limited forces are troops remaining after nuclear strikes and continuing combat operations in temporary rather than standard formations, i.e., mainly in the form of composite groups. It is these very composite groups formed from the remnants of standard combat organizations which comprise the main material content of limited forces.

This definition corresponds to the instructions in the guidance documents for operational and combat training of recent years in which limited forces are understood to be the troops remaining after enemy nuclear strikes i.e., composite detachments, battalions, and regiments. We emphasize that what should be meant is not the remaining troops in general (the troops can also sustain insignificant losses), but specifically their composite groups, i.e., numerous composite troop elements of various arms of troops and special troops, not only at the tactical level but also at the operational level. True, the term "composite groups of troops" is absent from the documents mentioned; however, in our view, the very essence of the problem of limited forces requires that the term be acknowledged.

To characterize limited forces, it is important to establish their relationship to the scales and nature of losses of troops. Defining this relationship is facilitated if the losses are, for the sake of convention, divided into large, significant, and insignificant.

Large losses lead to a fundamental rebuilding of the organizational structure of a majority of the main troop organizations of a given

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formation or large unit (and, first of all, the large units, units and subunits of the rocket troops and tank troops). Composite groups of various scales are established on the base of their remnants. Significant losses can give rise to the need to establish composite groups only in a few of the main troop organizations, while with insignificant losses, the troops as a rule operate in their former standard organizational form.

The appearance of limited forces on the scale of an entire formation (large unit, unit) is connected with large losses of troops when the organizational structure is fundamentally changed, the combat capabilities of the troops are sharply reduced, and the system of control of the troops is completely rebuilt. In that instance an army, in essence, ceases to be an army, and a division ceases to be a division; limited forces of a given formation (large unit, unit) are formed.

Troop organizations which have sustained significant losses should not be considered as a whole as limited forces. However, we cannot fail to consider the fact that in their complement there will also be separate composite groups. In essence, they occupy an intermediate position between troops of standard strength and limited forces. Their characteristic methods of combat operations will be those of both types of formations. Consequently, if we determine the qualitative distinctions in the operations of limited forces, we will thereby establish special features of the operations of troops which have sustained significant losses. However, these special features will have less importance for the latter than for the limited forces.

However, isn't such an approach one-sided, since it only indirectly considers changes in the main capabilities, i.e., the nuclear capabilities of the troops? We cannot, you know, rule out that the nuclear capabilities of a given formation or large unit may be sharply curtailed or reduced to zero, while the combat strength and organizational structure of a formation or large unit as a whole are retained (or relatively retained). Shouldn't a troop organization be considered as limited forces in that case? We think that it should not. Of course, the combat capabilities of a formation or large unit are sharply reduced when it loses its own nuclear capabilities. They may be replenished relatively quickly, however, by the delivery of additional nuclear strikes by the means of a senior commander, or by supplying nuclear warheads to replace those expended or put out of action. If, in addition, the enemy sustains significant losses in nuclear weapons, and this will be the rule, then, with timely and sufficiently effective redistribution of nuclear strikes, the rate of development of the operation (battle) may even remain as before. At worst, the formation or

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large unit will go over to a temporary defense; however, there is no basis for contending that it has lost the capability to operate in its original organizational forms, nor then is there any basis for considering these troops as limited forces.

In our opinion, this concept of the essence of limited forces permits a more flexible approach to the definition of the combat capabilities of troops and their methods of combat operations. The existing difference of opinions regarding the percentage expression of losses, corresponding to a certain degree of combat capability, evidently is not one of principle. It appears impossible to establish an accurate percentage expression theoretically, and in combat reality, deviations of the real combat capability of troops from some sort of "norms" are inevitable (The influence of those factors which are difficult to account for with the necessary accuracy will be extremely great, for example, the influence of the psychological-morale factor.).

Limited forces, as already noted, may be formed on the base of any troop organization from battalion to front. Their combat and organizational strength will be most varied--it is impossible to provide for its variants even on a theoretical level. However, regardless of strength (scales), limited forces require a unified approach to estimating their combat capability and typical special features of combat operations will be characteristic of them.

The degree of their combat capability also must be estimated differently for limited forces. If the combat capability of standard formations, large units and units is characterized by their capabilities to fulfil the standard combat tasks established by regulations and manuals, another approach is needed in estimating the combat capability of limited forces.

The combat capability of limited forces obviously has to be examined from the standpoint of their capabilities for fulfilling the combat tasks stemming from the specific situation developing as a result of large losses of troops. In a number of cases, limited forces will be able to successfully fulfil those combat tasks which previously were assigned to the formations (large units, units) on whose base the limited forces were formed. This degree of combat capability could be called, for the sake of convention, the maximum. A disadvantageous situation requires revising the previously assigned tasks, since the limited forces will be able to fulfil a smaller volume of tasks and their combat capability obviously will be the minimum.

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In estimating the combat capability of limited forces, one cannot, first of all, proceed from their combat strength as is done in determining the combat capability of standard troop organizations. Such factors as the relationship of forces and means, the psychological-morale condition of the troops, their operational-tactical situation, the status of the systems of ~~control of the~~ troops, and their comprehensive support come to the forefront here.

The process of restoring combat capability also must embrace a varying content for various scales of losses. When losses are insignificant or significant (as in the above interpretation) the restoration of combat capability is manifested, first of all, in reinforcing a given troop organization with personnel, arms, combat equipment and materiel supplies, and in restoring ~~control~~. But when a standard troop organization has sustained large losses or has even completely lost its combat capability, restoring it usually will mean, first of all, establishing composite groups on the base of the remnants of the troops. One obviously has a greater basis here for speaking, not of restoring the combat capability of a given troop organization, for example, of a division (instead of the former division, its composite detachment will operate), but of restoring the combat capability of the troops of a given formation, large unit or unit. In other words, restoring the combat effectiveness of troops with large losses assumes a qualitatively new form.

Finally, the main element in the varying approach to the operations of troops of standard strength and the operations of limited forces consists of the fact that the methods of the combat operations of limited forces will have substantial special features in comparision with the methods provided for in the regulations and manuals currently in force. To examine these special features, one must first throw light on the essence of the various composite groups and of the principles of the establishment of the groups.

Composite groups of troops. Tactical composite groups include composite detachments, battalions, and regiments. In a quantitative respect, these mainly will be combined-arms composite groups. Their essence is contained in the following.

Composite detachment: this is a temporary composite troop formation which is fundamentally different from authorized troop organizations. It seems that composite detachments may be of two types. The first--the remnants of subunits (units, large units) which have not yet formed into composite battalions, regiments or divisions. The strength of such a

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detachment may be most varied; it does not seem possible to determine its table of organization in advance. There may be battalion, regimental or divisional composite detachments. For example, a regimental composite detachment may be composed of four motorized rifle companies from different battalions, one tank company, separate platoons from artillery subunits and combat support subunits, and part of the headquarters of the regiment. This, of course, is not a composite battalion but actually a detachment. Afterwards, by merging it with other similar detachments (remnants of other regiments), a composite regiment, made up of composite battalions, may be formed. Until this happens,the composite detachment operates, and it must have a strictly defined designation (for example, Composite Detachment of the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment).

The second type of composite detachment is a kind of temporary formation that includes a certain number of composite battalions or regiments established on the base of remnants of their own organic units and subunits. For example, one composite regiment is established from the remnants of the three motorized rifle regiments in a division. In a given large unit there will be two regiments, one of them a composite regiment and the other an organic (tank) regiment which has retained its combat capability, along with some other units which have sustained large losses. This kind of formation will more correctly be called a composite detachment of a division.

Composite regiment (and correspondingly a composite battalion): this, in our view, is a troop organization approximately equal in strength to an average-strength regiment and formed from the remnants of several units which have lost combat capability. Its base, of course, will be the regiment which has sustained the least losses. This will give a particular group of troops the right to assume the corresponding regiment number (for example, the 15th Composite Motorized Rifle Regiment). The importance of a correct procedure for numbering the composite troop elements should be emphasized in order to avoid the possible misunderstandings that may arise in the process of their formation and combat operations. Obviously , in all cases, the higher headquarters must have the right to assign a particular number to them.

It also is appropriate to raise the question of operational composite groups. The question is, first and foremost one of composite divisions, whose establishment from the remnants of several combined-arms large units to carry out operational tasks on a certain axis cannot be ruled out. Composite operational groups also may be established from the remnants of

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various units and large units of the other branch arms (special troops) of an army and front.

Composite divisions, obviously, may be established under conditions when two or three divisions have lost their combat capability, and their composite detachments are unable to accomplish large operational tasks independently, when the capabilities for achieving successful operational cooperation of the remnants of combined-arms large units have sharply deteriorated, or when the operational significance of one of the offensive axes of two weakened combined-arms groupings has radically changed. Regardless of a certain loss of time involved in regrouping troops and organizing composite divisions, their establishment can ensure the achievement of a significant operational result: instead of two weak groupings of troops operating on two separated axes, one considerably stronger grouping is established. In this way, a higher degree of centralization in the use of tactical nuclear weapons is achieved, cooperation with the rocket troops of the army and the front and with aviation is improved, and control of the troops and their comprehensive support is facilitated. However, the numerous organizational problems of combining the remnants of two or three divisions are a long way from always being solved in a short time. Therefore, in a number of cases it will be necessary to proceed with temporary subordination of one divisional composite detachment to another during their combined operations.

The establishment of composite groups of troops is an obligatory and extremely complicated measure--especially for troops of the first echelon--which has to be implemented under active counteraction from the enemy side. The highest priority task for these troops after the restoration of control is to establish composite detachments, then composite battalions, regiments and divisions. The conversion of composite detachments into these troop organizations must be accomplished in sequence during the course of combat operations, so that it will have the least possible effect on the offensive momentum. In an offensive, the composite detachments, by maneuvering skilfully and approaching gradually, may be joined together in a certain area into a single composite group of one scale or another. In a number of instances, for example, when the offensive is developing successfully, when a wide front of pursuit is created, or when a certain axis has to be covered on a wide front, the composite detachments may operate independently for a certain time, right up until relieved by newly-approaching troops.

In resolving the question of the number of composite groups being established, the specific situation, of course, has to be considered. In a

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general statement of this question, one should proceed from the fact that under conditions of nuclear war there will be no need to capture all or most of the enemy territory. The main objective of the formations on the offensive, including those operating as limited forces, will be to seize only individual important areas which have survived the strikes of nuclear weapons. Because of the tremendous destruction and radioactive contamination of the terrain, the operations of the troops will be impossible for a long time in particular areas; as a result, these areas will lose their operational significance. Looking at it objectively, this reduces the necessity for the operations of various groupings of troops on many axes.

Because of this, theoretically, one should not establish a large number of separate composite groups. It will be more desirable to try to combine them to the maximum extent possible (in accordance with the nature of the task and the situation, of course), in order to concentrate efforts on decisive axes and achieve tactical and operational objectives. From this viewpoint, the establishment of relatively large composite groups (of the composite division or regiment type), obviously, will become a more frequent phenomenon in nuclear war.

Most important in the problem being examined is the question of the methods of combat operations of limited forces. As is generally known, the methods of combat operations are determined by the level of development of the means of armed combat. Limited forces have the same weapons and combat equipment as conventional troops, although in different quantities and proportions. Therefore, their methods of combat operations cannot be fundamentally different from the methods of formations (large units, units) of standard strength. However, we cannot neglect to allow for the quantitative and qualitative changes characterizing the combat strength and organizational structure of the limited forces, and the combat situation which has developed by the time they are formed. These changes, as a rule, will be so great that they hardly will allow mechanically carrying the methods of combat operations of standard-strength troops over to the methods of operations of limited forces. The nature and methods of operations of limited forces, of course, will be determined to a decisive extent by the relationship of forces with the enemy. Regardless of their combat capabilities, limited forces may be weaker than the enemy forces, equal to them, or even superior to them if the enemy has sustained large losses. These conditions, the specifics of organization and the combat inferiority, always will affect the procedures and methods of their operations. Therefore, it is appropriate to raise the question of certain special features of their combat operations. In our view, the presence of such special features is evident even from a brief comparison of the

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possible operational disposition of an army of standard strength in an offensive operation and the possible operational disposition of limited forces of the same army after the enemy has delivered a series of nuclear strikes (see diagram). We will dwell on some of them.

First, the special features of the combat tasks. In general, they will be determined mainly in terms of the combat capability of the composite groups and the overall relationship of forces. Since the specific characteristics of these factors cannot be determined in advance, the question can be resolved only theoretically: if the enemy is in even worse condition than the given limited forces, these forces can retain their former combat task. Even in that case, however, tasks as a rule have to be revised as to their completion time, since establishing the composite groups requires time to reorganize and regroup the troops, and to refine coordination or organize it on a new basis. It must not be forgotten that the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes will be eliminated at the same time. Whether we like it or not, temporary halts of troops, obviously, are unavoidable, and the offensive momentum may be reduced in the organizational stage of forming limited forces. All this will require revising the tasks in terms of time. If the situation proves to be more complex, i.e., the enemy is equal in strength or superior, the tasks will change mainly in terms of space, in depth and in width of front, and in a number of instances a temporary transition to the defense will be unavoidable.

Determining the depth of the tasks and the width of the offensive zone of the limited forces requires consideration of the specific conditions of the situation. Obviously, when combat tasks are being assigned (revised), limited forces of any scale should be given only the immediate task and the axis of further offensive. The combat task will no longer be typically "regimental" or "divisional". For example, it will not always be desirable to assign a composite regiment the standard task of a conventional regiment. The composite regiment composition may have a deficiency or, on the other hand, a surplus of certain subunits of the branch arms (special troops), and a deficiency or surplus of certain weapons and combat equipment. Such a regiment may be significantly weaker in terms of the amount of forces and means, and sometimes stronger than a conventional regiment. However, in all instances it will be characterized by insufficient organizational and combat teamwork. Until their organizational composition breaks down, troop organizations may be said to have a certain cohesiveness: the commanding officers know their personnel, and the subordinates know their commanding officers and each other. All this changes when composite organizations are formed. As a whole these

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circumstances and other factors (and, first and foremost, the relationship of forces with the enemy) make for a different degree of combat capability and, consequently, a very different depth of tasks of the composite groups and of limited forces in general.

The width of the offensive zones. Theoretically this may be narrowed by widening those of adjacent units, if they retain their combat capability, or it may remain as formerly if adjacent formations, large units and units also are operating in severely weakened groupings. In a number of instances, when large gaps have been formed between groupings of troops, it obviously will be desirable to assign to the limited forces (primarily of a tactical scale) only the axis of the offensive, i.e., forego the allocation of zones. Finally, to the composite formations and surviving standard formations operating within the composition of limited forces there may be assigned combat tasks varying in content: to some, complete tasks (in accordance with the regulations or close to them); to others, partial tasks which deviate from the norms of the regulations.

Theoretically, limited forces have to operate on secondary axes. This will be far from always happening, however, since massive losses are possible in all formations (large units) of the first echelon. Accordingly, even the troops of a greatly weakened strike grouping can as before play the leading role in developing an operation. Radical changes in their combat capability will require still more decisive concentration of the nuclear efforts of the front and the army on the axis of operations and more rapid commitment of the reserves.

An important special feature in the use of nuclear weapons in a zone of operations of limited forces, in our view, will be to forego the simultaneous destruction of the enemy to the entire depth of his operational (combat) disposition and go over to destruction in sequence. In this case, it is not a question of an initial nuclear strike, since simultaneous destruction is inflicted on the enemy not only at its onset, but also during the operation. The center of gravity of the nuclear strikes obviously must be brought close to the front line, in order to increase the capabilities of the limited forces for immediate exploitation of the results of these strikes. As the troops progress, the deeper targets must be destroyed in sequence. (These do not include nuclear means of attack, which must be destroyed immediately at any depth). Thus, defeat of the enemy in detail is ensured, and favorable conditions are created for developing the offensive at a higher momentum and to a great depth.

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This also is conditioned by the fact that the nuclear capabilities of the formations (large units) will be sharply reduced right after the exchange of initial nuclear strikes and during the course of subsequent combat operations. Of course, the number of targets to be destroyed also will be reduced, which to a certain extent smooths over the deficiency in nuclear capabilities. As a rule, single and salvo nuclear strikes will be delivered against the most important targets. As a whole, however, ground forces capabilities for simultaneous destruction of the enemy to the entire depth will be extremely limited, particularly when long-range nuclear means go out of action. Therefore, transferring the center of gravity of the nuclear strikes closer to the front line will be not only desirable but even necessary. In so doing, the rocket troops of the operational formations will destroy not only operational targets but also important tactical targets, since the role of composite tactical groups in accomplishing operational tasks will increase sharply, while their own nuclear capabilities may be extremely limited. This also concerns front aviation, the efforts of which must to a large extent be directed to support of the ground forces which have sustained large losses. This principle of using rocket troops and aviation will be implemented primarily in cooperation with those limited forces of operational scale operating on the main axes and having the most success.

A decisive condition for the success of an offensive by limited forces will be rapid exploitation of the results of the nuclear strikes, and also of the results of successful operations of the troops which have retained a capability. It is most advisable to bypass certain centers of resistance, rather than become involved in drawn-out battles which, besides wasting time, result in a further weakening of the combat capabilities of the limited forces. In this respect, their operations (especially those of the tactical groupings) will be to a considerable extent similar to the operations of forward detachments. In other words, the basis of the operations of the limited forces must be established as primarily the achievement of territorial success and the seizure of the most important areas (targets), and not the destruction of a certain enemy grouping. This, of course, does not rule out conducting intensive engagements (battles) with surviving enemy groupings when it is impossible for limited forces to progress further without destroying individual centers of resistance.

The control of limited forces should be formed on an essentially new base, since the old system will have been disrupted. All the forces and means of control can be concentrated at surviving command posts. In this case, the army echelon can effect direct control of separate composite

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regiments, and the front can effect direct control of composite or surviving divisions. The variants for rebuilding the control system will be most varied: control of the troops of a higher echelon may be transferred to one of the lower echelons; new field headquarters with reduced personnel strength or operations groups may be established at the expense of the field headquarters of the front; or remnants of troops or separate divisions may be resubordinated to another army. In a number of cases, all the methods for restoring the system of control may be used simultaneously. Without examining these problems in detail, we should at least mention that under conditions of massive losses of both troops and command posts, the capabilities for control of the troops will have a considerable effect on the methods of combat operations of the limited forces.

The combat operations of limited forces may have other special features besides those stated special features which, in our view, are the most important ones. Thoroughly working out these special features is one of the urgent tasks of our military theory. For the purpose of a more complete study of the problem of limited forces, obviously the number of exercises and war games with appropriate themes should be increased substantially, a series of experimental exercises should be conducted and the theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations obtained should be consolidated in independent sections of the regulations and manuals the next time they are revised.

(See Diagram and Key on following pages)

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Diagram



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Key to Diagram

1. a) in a standard troop strength
2. 10th Tank Division
3. 4th Motorized Rifle Division
4. Up to two mechanized divisions
5. 3rd Motorized Rifle Division
6. Forward Command Post
7. 6th SAM Regiment
8. Army mobile missile technical base
9. Army mobile obstacle detachment
10. 6th Army Headquarters
11. 7th Separate SAM Battalion
12. 6th Army Rocket Brigade
13. 15th Motorized Rifle Division
14. Chemical troops reserves
15. Engineer troops reserves
16. Army mobile missile technical base
17. Rear Services Command Post
18. 17th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
19. 12th Motorized Rifle Division
20. Army antitank reserves
21. b) in limited forces strength
22. Composite detachments of tank regiments
23. Tank regiment
24. Composite Detachment of the 4th Motorized Regiment
25. Composite Battalion
26. Composite Regiment 3rd Motorized Rifle Division
27. Composite Detachment of the 10th Tank Regiment
28. 6th Army Forward Command Post
29. 4th Motorized Rifle Division
30. Composite SAM Battalion of the 6th SAM Regiment
31. Army mobile missile technical base
32. Army antitank reserves & mobile obstacle detachment
33. 7th SAM Battalion
34. Rocket Battalion
35. 6th Army Rocket Brigade

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Key to Diagram
(continued)

36. 15th Motorized Rifle Division
37. Remnants of chemical troops and engineering reserves
38. Army mobile missile technical base
39. 17th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment
40. Rear Services Command Post
41. Composite Detachment of the 12th Motorized Rifle Division
42. Remnants of two mechanized divisions

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